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INTRODUCTION 
On May 10, 2005, in connection with his own criminal 
investigation and arrest, Shon Lindstrom provided the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with information regarding an 
online child pornography exchange in which he had participated.1  
Lindstrom informed police that a man by the name of Jerry 
Banks had electronically shared with Lindstrom pornographic 
videos depicting Banks’s sexual abuse of his two-year-old 
grandson.2  The FBI’s subsequent investigation revealed that 
Banks was the moderator and host of an online chat room called 
“Kid Sex and Incest,” where “numerous” child pornography files 
were available for download.3  On May 21, 2005, a search 
warrant was executed upon Banks’s computer and electronic 
storage devices.4  Among these devices, the FBI found material 
constituting child pornography, including a video portraying 
Banks’s masturbation of his grandson, as had been described by 
Lindstrom.5  Banks, who had already served time in prison for 
sexually abusing his own son, was arrested and charged with the 
possession, production, transportation, and receipt of images of 
child pornography.6 
 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s 
University School of Law; Dual B.A., cum laude, Latin and Psychology, 2004, Boston 
University. I am grateful to Professors Robert Ruescher and Marc DeGirolami for 
their unending advice and guidance throughout the writing process. A very special 
thank you to my husband, John Kelly, for his tireless support, advice, and love. 
1 United States v. Banks, No. CR. 06-051-S-BLW-WBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
82368, at *1–2 (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2006). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at *2–3. 
4 Id. at *3. 
5 United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2009). 
6 Id. at 971; id. at 982 (Alarcón, C.J., concurring); see 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006 & 
Supp. II 2008). 
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At his bench trial, the defendant’s wife, Kathryn Banks, 
testified as to incriminating comments her husband made to her 
prior to his arrest regarding the video.7  Banks was convicted at 
the trial level and later appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that under the federal common law 
doctrine of spousal privilege, the district court had erred by not 
allowing him to invoke the spousal communications privilege in 
order to preclude his wife’s testimony.8  The Ninth Circuit 
agreed, rejecting the district court’s somewhat progressive 
application of the spousal privilege.9  Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit disagreed with the district court’s extension of an existing 
exception to the spousal privilege—namely, the spousal crime 
exception, which rendered the privilege inapplicable when the 
defendant was charged with committing crimes against his or her 
spouse—to also encompass cases where, as in the instant case, 
the defendant was charged with crimes against his or her 
grandchild.10  Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that the scope of the 
exception was limited to instances in which a defendant was 
charged with crimes against a child or the “functional equivalent” 
of a child of one or both of the spouses and further stated that 
Banks’s grandson did not qualify as the “functional equivalent” of 
his or his wife’s child.11 
Through its holding in Banks, the Ninth Circuit effectively 
decided that the spousal communications privilege, an 
evidentiary canon aimed at protecting confidential 
communications between spouses,12 should prevail even where a 
defendant is accused of a devastating and morally reprehensible 
crime—but only if the victim was not the “functional equivalent” 
 
7 Id. at 971 (majority opinion) (stating that Mrs. Banks testified that the 
defendant had made statements to her wherein he admitted to creating the video in 
order to assure her that “nothing went on in changing the diaper because of past 
things”). 
8 Id. at 974. 
9 Id. at 975–78. 
10 Id. at 976. 
11 Id. at 974–78. The court explained that relationships that would be 
considered the “functional equivalent” of a parent-child relationship would carry 
“indicia of guardianship and responsibility.” Id. at 976. It went on to note other 
factors relevant to such a determination, including whether there was a consistency 
of care greater than “[i]nfrequent overnight visits” and whether the child-victim 
lived on a full time basis with the defendant at the time of the alleged incidents. Id. 
12 See infra Part I.B. 
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of his or his spouse’s child.13  Other federal courts, including the 
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Allery14 and the Tenth Circuit 
in United States v. Bahe,15 had previously considered the 
applicability of the spousal communications privilege or its 
counterpart, the adverse testimonial privilege, in cases where the 
defendant was accused of sexual crimes against a minor.  While 
both the Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit considered general 
policy goals in their decisions, each court limited its analysis to 
address only circumstances involving allegations with a child or 
minor as alleged victim.16  All three circuits, therefore, in 
focusing on the status of the alleged victim, failed to adequately 
consider the particularly heinous nature of the types of crimes 
alleged in the three cases—attempted rape,17 sexual abuse,18 and 
the production and distribution of child pornography.19 
Both the spousal communications privilege and the adverse 
testimonial privilege are rooted in ancient evidentiary principles 
favoring the promotion of marital intimacy and privacy.20  Over 
time, federal courts began recognizing an exception to these 
privileges—known as the “spousal crime” exception, involving 
crimes committed by one spouse against the other—in the 
interests of justice and fairness.21  As seen in Banks, Allery, and 
Bahe, courts have contemplated, and disagreed about, whether 
this exception should extend to sexually abusive crimes 
committed against minors.22  This Note argues that federal 
courts, in considering the applicability of either the spousal 
communications privilege or the adverse testimonial privilege,23 
should look to the type of crime alleged against the defendant and 
should carve out an exception rendering these privileges 
 
13 Banks, 556 F.3d at 976. 
14 United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975). 
15 United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997). 
16 See Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1446; Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366–67. 
17 Allery, 526 F.2d at 1363 (stating that the defendant was charged with 
attempting to rape his twelve-year-old daughter). 
18 Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1441 (stating that the defendant was charged with sexual 
abuse for allegedly penetrating his eleven-year-old female relative’s vagina with his 
hand and finger). 
19 United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2009). 
20 See infra Part I. 
21 Allery, 526 F.2d at 1365. 
22 See Banks, 556 F.3d at 974; Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1441; Allery, 526 F.2d at 1365. 
23 Two separate spousal privileges exist: the spousal communications privilege 
and the adverse testimonial privilege. See infra Part I. 
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unavailable wherever the defendant has been charged with a sex 
crime,24 regardless of the victim’s age or relationship to the 
defendant.  This Note discusses and explains the uniquely 
heinous nature of such crimes, their markedly devastating effects 
on victims, and the inherent challenges and difficulties in 
successful prosecution, in order to emphasize the importance of 
allowing them special evidentiary consideration. 
Part I discusses the history of spousal privileges, the two 
types of spousal privileges, and the justifications most often cited 
in support of their continued application.  Part II reviews the 
evolution of the spousal crime exception and how different 
federal courts have broadened or expanded the scope of the 
exception in the context of cases involving crimes allegedly 
committed against a child victim.  Part III discusses Federal 
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415—landmark changes to 
federal evidentiary law reflecting Congress’s special concern for 
admitting certain probative evidence in sexual assault and child 
molestation cases.  Lastly, Part IV argues that, in light of the 
unique characteristics of sex crimes—namely, their particularly 
reprehensible nature, their lasting effects upon both victims and 
society at large, the inherent difficulties in prosecuting them, and 
the pressing need to successfully and correctly convict sex 
offenders—which set them apart from other crimes, the 
traditional justifications behind spousal privileges fail to support 
their continued application to cases involving alleged sex crimes. 
 
24 For the purposes of this Note, the term “sex crime” encompasses crimes 
prosecuted under the following federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006 & Supp. I 
2007) (entitled “Aggravated sexual abuse”); 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) 
(entitled “Sexual abuse”); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (entitled “Sexual 
abuse of a minor or ward”); 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (entitled 
“Abusive sexual contact”); and any other federal offense, including offenses relating 
to the production, distribution, receiving, or possession with intent to distribute of 
obscene material involving minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, where it is 
alleged that the defendant, in furtherance of the offense, committed acts which 
would tend to satisfy the elements of one of the above listed crimes at a prima facie 
level, regardless of whether the defendant was formally charged with any of the 
above listed crimes. For example, the author’s definition of “sex crime” would apply 
in the Banks case, because the defendant was accused of committing acts against his 
grandson which would constitute at least a prima facie case under section 2243 of 
the United States Code. 
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I. HISTORY OF SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES 
The very existence of privileges in the realm of evidentiary 
law signifies a weighty societal importance bestowed upon 
certain relationships, as such privileges often operate to exclude 
accurate, reliable, and extremely probative evidence that is often 
otherwise unattainable.25  In particular, privileges emphasize 
and encourage free disclosure and the protection of privacy and 
trust in certain revered personal and professional relationships.26  
Examples of these traditionally revered relationships include 
attorney-client, clergy-penitent, psychotherapist-patient, and, 
significantly, husband-wife.27  Dating back centuries, spousal 
privileges have long functioned to protect the marital 
relationship and promote familial harmony.28 
Another unique attribute of privileges, at least in the realm 
of evidentiary rules, is that they are guided by federal common 
law.29  In 1958, the drafting process of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence began with the goal of codifying and clarifying the 
common law rules, which had dominated the federal courts for 
centuries.30  The judiciary committee that drafted the rules 
struggled to overcome internal conflict and reach agreement over 
how to draft rules governing evidentiary privileges.31  Ultimately, 
the judiciary committee recommended through Draft Article V 
that many traditionally recognized privileges be eliminated.32  
Congress, however, reacted vehemently to the committee’s 
suggestions in Draft Article V, and a “fruitless” two-year debate 
ensued.33  The “hot potato” of privilege doctrine proved both 
“controversial” and “emotionally provocative,”34 and eventually 
Congress decided that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 would 
 
25 Emily C. Aldridge, Note, To Catch a Predator or To Save His Marriage: 
Advocating for an Expansive Child Abuse Exception to the Marital Privileges in 
Federal Courts, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1767 (2010). 
26 Id. 
27 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43–52 (1980). 
28 See infra Part I.C. 
29 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1765. 
30 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on 
Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The 
Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41, 4445 
(2006). 
31 Id. at 4647. 
32 Id. at 47. 
33 Id. at 47–48; Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1770. 
34 Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 48, 50. 
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replace any precise rules governing evidentiary privileges.35  As a 
result, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is the only rule covering 
evidentiary privileges and functions to give the power to the 
federal courts themselves to expand, limit, shape, and change the 
law of privileges as they see fit “in light of reason and 
experience.”36 
This power—that is, the power to shape privileges as time 
goes on and societal norms change—necessarily indicates that 
the Legislature intended this area of evidentiary law to be 
dynamic.  This Note argues that “reason and experience” have 
shown that sex crimes, with their uniquely reprehensible nature, 
traumatic effect on their victims, serious risks to society, and 
difficulties in prosecution warrant their own exception to the 
traditionally-recognized spousal privileges in federal courts.  In 
order to familiarize the reader with spousal privileges, how they 
work, and the justifications behind their current application in 
federal courts, Parts I.A and I.B will explain the two types of 
spousal privileges and how they differ.  Part I.C will then discuss 
the two principally-cited justifications for the continued 
application of spousal privileges in federal courts. 
A. Adverse Testimonial Privilege 
The adverse testimonial privilege37 prevents a witness from 
being compelled to testify against his or her spouse.38  A “vestige 
of a long-abandoned common law rule,”39 the privilege dates back 
 
35 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1770–71. 
36 FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United States courts 
in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the 
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”). 
37 The adverse testimonial privilege has also been called the “testimonial 
privilege,” the “marital testimonial privilege,” the “spousal testimonial privilege” or 
the “ ‘marital or spousal ‘disqualification’ privilege.” Mark Glover, Evidentiary 
Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting Children Inside and Outside of 
Marriage, 70 La. L. Rev. 751, 761 (2010); R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal 
Privileges After Crawford, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 339, 356 (2006); Aldridge, supra note 
25, at 1765. In other contexts, it has also been called the “ ‘anti-marital facts’ 
privilege.” United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992). For the 
purposes of this Note, the privilege will be referred to as the “adverse testimonial 
privilege.” 
38 Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered 
Rationale, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 12 (1999). 
39 Cassidy, supra note 37; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43–44 
(1980); Glover, supra note 37, at 762. 
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to the seventeenth century and the doctrine of spousal 
incompetency,40 which dictated that, because a woman was her 
husband’s property, allowing her testimony against her spouse 
would effectively amount to forced self-incrimination.41  Running 
concurrently with that doctrine was the canon that a party may 
not testify on his own behalf given his interest in the outcome of 
the proceedings.42  Although the Supreme Court abrogated the 
doctrine of spousal incompetency in 1933 through its holding in 
Funk v. United States,43 the Court preserved the adverse 
testimonial privilege itself.44  Later, in Hawkins v. United States, 
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the adverse testimonial 
privilege operates to preserve the marital relationship.45  
Approximately twenty years later, in Trammel v. United States, 
the Court retreated somewhat from its earlier views and 
significantly changed the scope of the privilege by limiting the 
ability to invoke its protection to the witness-spouse only, 
effectively eliminating a defendant-spouse’s right to single-
handedly bar testimony of his or her spouse.46  In doing so, the 
Court reasoned that, where a witness-spouse is willing to testify 
in a criminal proceeding against his or her spouse, the marriage 
is likely in “disrepair” and the rationale behind the spousal 
privilege would not be furthered by allowing a defendant-spouse 
to bar such testimony.47 
In order for the adverse testimonial privilege to apply, three 
requirements must be met: (1) the proceedings for which the 
privilege is sought to be invoked must be of a criminal nature; 
(2) the couple must be legally married at the time of trial; and 
(3) the invoking party may only invoke the privilege with respect 
 
40 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1772. 
41 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Glover, supra note 37, at 762. 
42 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Cassidy, supra note 37. 
43 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933). 
44 Id. at 386–87 (overturning prior cases which held that a wife was excluded 
from testifying for her husband due to her interest in the event, without regard to 
the type of testimony she might give). 
45 358 U.S. 74, 77–79 (1958) (explaining that “[a]dverse testimony given in 
criminal proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage”). 
46 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. 
47 Id. at 52 (“When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a 
criminal proceeding—whatever the motivation—their relationship is almost 
certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the 
privilege to preserve.”). 
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to testimony tending to incriminate the defendant-spouse.48  The 
testimonial privilege thus specifically operates to preserve 
marriages currently in existence at the time of trial, without 
regard to whether the defendant and his or her spouse were 
legally married at the time of the event in question.49 
Much criticism has been leveled at the adverse testimonial 
privilege over the years.50  Courts and scholars have long 
denounced the idea that wives are their husbands’ chattel and 
similarly have rejected the ancient doctrine that assumes only 
one shared, unitary identity between spouses.51  The Supreme 
Court’s holding in Trammel belies its own discomfort with the 
prospect of preserving a marriage at the expense of justice in 
cases where the witness-spouse is willing to actively assist in the 
defendant-spouse’s conviction.  In the struggle to balance 
competing interests in justice and preserving marriage through 
the adverse testimonial privilege’s continued application, some 
courts have even taken it upon themselves to impose a judicial 
review of a marriage’s viability, attempting to reach a judicial 
determination regarding whether a marriage is stable enough to 
warrant legal protection where the defendant-spouse and the 
witness-spouse are separated at the time of trial.52 
B. Spousal Communications Privilege 
The spousal communications privilege53 may be one of the 
oldest testimonial privileges in English common law.54  Its 
function has long been to bar disclosure of information obtained 
through private communications between the spouses, and 
generally may be invoked by either the witness-spouse or the 
 
48 Frost, supra note 38. 
49 Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
1450, 1567 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
50 Frost, supra note 38, at 13 (“The adverse testimony privilege has been under 
continuous attack . . . .”). 
51 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1775. 
52 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1566; Frost, supra note 38, at 14. 
53 The privilege has also been called the “marital communications privilege” or 
“confidential communications privilege.” See Developments in the Law, supra note 
49, at 1564–65. For the purposes of this Note, the privilege will be referred to as the 
“spousal communications privilege.” 
54 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357. But see 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227 (McNaughton ed., 1961); Developments in the 
Law, supra note 49, at 1565; Frost, supra note 38, at 8. 
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defendant-spouse in federal courts.55  The sanctity of marital 
trust and intimacy traditionally has been deemed so “essential” 
to preserving marriage as to outweigh the justice system’s 
interests in using evidence barred by the privilege to secure 
criminal convictions.56  The spousal communications privilege 
therefore operates to guard marital intimacy and privacy, in that 
it protects all confidential communications made between 
spouses during the course of their marriage without regard to 
whether that marriage remains intact at the time of trial.57 
In order for the spousal communications privilege to be 
applicable, three prerequisites must be met.58  First, there must 
have been a communication between the spouses.59  These 
communications generally involve written and verbal expressions 
made with a “subjective intent to transmit information.”60  The 
second requirement is that the communication was intended to 
be kept confidential.61  While there is a general presumption that 
spousal communications are confidential, this presumption may 
be rebutted either by showing that the spouses knew that a third 
party was present for the communication or that, regardless of 
the circumstances under which the communication was actually 
made, the communicating spouse intended the statements to be 
disclosed to others.62  Lastly, the defendant-spouse and the 
witness-spouse must have been legally married at the time the 
communication was made.63 
The spousal communications privilege differs from the 
adverse testimonial privilege in a few ways.  While the adverse 
testimonial privilege is held by the witness-spouse, in that he or 
she has the ability to choose whether to testify against the 
 
55 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1776–77. 
56 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (stating that “[t]he basis of the 
immunity given to communications between husband and wife is the protection of 
marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage 
relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which 
the privilege entails”); see also Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358. 
57 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1777–78. 
58 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357. 
59 Id. 
60 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1572; see also Cassidy, supra note 
37, at 357 (describing communications as “words or utterances intended to convey a 
message”). 
61 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357–58. 
62 Glover, supra note 37, at 765. 
63 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357. 
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defendant-spouse, the spousal communications privilege may be 
invoked by either the witness-spouse or the defendant-spouse—
thus allowing a defendant-spouse to bar his or her spouse from 
testifying, regardless of the witness-spouse’s desire to testify.64  
Furthermore, unlike the adverse testimonial privilege, the 
spousal communications privilege applies in both criminal and 
civil proceedings.65  Lastly, while the applicability of the adverse 
testimonial privilege hinges on whether the spouses are still 
legally married at the time of trial, the applicability of the 
spousal communications privilege is contingent only on whether 
the defendant-spouse and the witness-spouse were legally 
married at the time the communications in question occurred.66 
The spousal communications privilege generally has received 
less scrutiny than its sister privilege.67  Commentators, however, 
have noted that the application of the confidential 
communications privilege can be complicated because marriages 
do not consist wholly of oral and written communications.68  For 
example, it may be difficult to determine whether nonverbal 
signals and gestures—typically well understood between 
spouses—technically constitute “communications,” despite the 
fact that the purported justifications behind the privilege would 
seem to render these nonverbal signals just as subject to 
protection as their verbal counterparts.69  Additionally, as seen in 
Banks, communications between spouses may be particularly 
probative and compelling, and the inadmissibility of such 
communications at trial arguably represents a more significant 
impediment to the administration of justice than even the 
adverse testimonial privilege. 
 
64 Id. at 356–58. 
65 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1776. 
66 Id. at 177778. 
67 Ryan v. Comm’r, 568 F.2d 531, 544 n.6 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing how the 
spousal communications privilege has avoided the “intense criticism” that has 
accompanied the adverse testimonial privilege); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2056–57 
(1995). 
68 Frost, supra note 38, at 1112. 
69 Id.; see United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(describing how the defendant often inserted his finger into his wife’s vagina while 
she was asleep, bent his finger into a “hook,” and pulled it out forcefully in order to 
signal to her that he wanted to have sex—a maneuver he also allegedly performed 
on an eleven-year-old female relative he was accused of sexually abusing). 
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C. Justifications for Spousal Privileges 
While spousal privileges traditionally have been supported 
on a variety of different policy grounds, there are two main 
justifications that commentators cite as rationale for their 
continued application.70  The utilitarian rationale, first 
promulgated by Professor Wigmore through a four-factor 
balancing test, has been applied to virtually all modern federal 
privileges71 and is frequently invoked by courts in balancing the 
costs and benefits to applying and/or extending evidentiary 
privileges.72  The other primary rationale among commentators 
and courts is the protection of marital and familial privacy, often 
called the “humanistic rationale.”73  Each of these justifications is 
discussed in turn below in Parts II.C.i and II.C.ii. 
In addition to these widely accepted justifications, other 
theories have been suggested to support the legacy of spousal 
privileges.  The “image theory,” although “never explicitly 
invoked by courts,” justifies the privilege as protecting the public 
perception or “image” of the legal system.74  This theory posits 
that the general public would find it repulsive for the legal 
 
70 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358 (stating that the primary 
justifications for spousal privileges are utilitarian and humanistic); Developments in 
the Law, supra note 49, at 1577 (stating that marital privileges are mainly 
supported on utilitarian grounds); Frost, supra note 38, at 15 (calling the utilitarian 
rationale the “most frequently cited justification” for at least the testimonial 
privileges). 
71 Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 63 (stating that both draft Article V and 
modern federal privilege law are supported primarily by Wigmore’s utilitarian 
analysis); see also Pamela A. Haun, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First 
Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 137, 141 (2001) (discussing how Wigmore’s analysis 
“should lie at the foundation of every rule of privileged communications”). 
72 For courts that have considered Professor Wigmore’s analysis or a variation 
thereof, see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10–15 (1996) (adopting a similar test); 
ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. Unit A. Mar. 1981), aff’d sub nom, 
ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (5th Cir. 1990); and Garner v. 
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying analysis to attorney-
client privileges). 
73 See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 36061; Developments in the Law, supra note 
49, at 158385. 
74 See Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1585 (stating that compelling 
an unwilling spouse to testify would place the legal system in a no-win situation, in 
that regardless of whether the witness was truthful or dishonest, the public could 
deem the forced testimony unfair); see also, e.g., A & M v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433, 
403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (4th Dep’t 1978) (holding that compelling adverse spousal 
testimony could “undermine” public trust in the legal system as a whole); Frost, 
supra note 38, at 20 (discussing how the image theory protects the reputation of the 
legal system by keeping out potentially unreliable testimony). 
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system to compel a person to testify against, and assist in the 
conviction of, his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding.75  This 
argument, however, fails to acknowledge the—presumably—
equally upsetting result of allowing a true criminal to avoid 
punishment and denying a true victim retribution.  The image 
theory further contends that the possible result of perjury where 
the law compels adverse spousal testimony may similarly serve 
to weaken the public’s faith in the justice system.76  Again, 
however, this position does not give due deference to the 
protections the justice system has in place for preventing perjury 
in the many circumstances where a witness may be reluctant to 
testify truthfully.  Because the possibility for perjury always 
exists—albeit in varying measures, depending on a multitude of 
factors—faith in the accuracy and legitimacy of the adversary 
system necessarily must depend on public trust in protections 
such as the oath taken by each witness, the process of cross-
examination, and an impartial jury’s role as fact-finder to stave 
off the inherent risk of false testimony.77 
Another secondary theory, the preservation of marriage 
theory, similarly has been offered as a justification for the 
continued application of spousal privileges.78  This theory posits 
that the preservation of domestic harmony is an important 
societal goal which sets marital privileges apart from 
professional privileges generally.79  This theory, however, tends 
to fold into the utilitarian analysis, as the weight of such a 
societal goal must ultimately be judged against the competing 
societal goal of administering justice.  This Note therefore does 
not address these two ancillary and less prevalent justifications, 
and instead focuses on the oft-cited utilitarian and humanistic 
theories of spousal privileges.80 
 
 
75 Frost, supra note 38, at 20. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at 21 (stating that the system is well-equipped to deal with biased 
witnesses and possesses the ability to charge those unwilling to testify with 
contempt of court). 
78 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1780–81; see also Frost, supra note 38, at 21–22. 
79 Frost, supra note 38, at 21–22. 
80 See infra Part I.C.12. 
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1. The Utilitarian Analysis and Professor Wigmore’s Test 
The utilitarian rationale focuses on a social cost-benefit 
analysis wherever an evidentiary privilege functions to exclude 
probative evidence.81  Professor Wigmore set forth a four-factor 
test involving four separate considerations for courts to use in 
deciding whether the social benefit of recognizing an evidentiary 
privilege tends to outweigh any resultant harm from the loss of 
the privileged evidence at trial.82  The utilitarian test allows an 
invoking court, in evaluating the applicability of a privilege, to 
determine whether the relationship at stake should ultimately be 
valued above the truth-finding function of the court.83  The 
utilitarian analysis generally differs from the “humanistic” 
approach84 in that it weighs systemic costs and benefits, as 
opposed to the narrower consideration of the importance of 
marital privacy for its own sake.85 
According to Professor Wigmore, the following four 
conditions must be met in order for a court to grant or recognize 
a privilege: 
The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed[;] 
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties[;] 
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered[; and] 
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.86 
While Professor Wigmore’s test specifically addresses 
communications, its basic idea can be and has been applied to a 
variety of evidentiary privileges, including the adverse 
testimonial privilege, through the fourth factor’s cost-benefit 
analysis.87 
 
81 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358 (stating that the utilitarian rationale justifies 
the recognition of a privilege “where the social benefits to be achieved from excusing 
the witness exceed the social costs of losing the testimony.”) 
82 See WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2285. 
83 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358. 
84 See infra Part I.C.2. 
85 See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358; Frost, supra note 38, at 16. 
86 See WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2285. 
87 See Frost, supra note 38, at 15–16. 
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The “traditional” utilitarian justification for the adverse 
testimonial privilege is that to force one spouse to testify against 
the other in a criminal proceeding would destroy the marriage 
and may promote perjury, such that the privilege, in allowing the 
witness-spouse to decide whether to testify, tends to prevent 
disharmony and encourage truthfulness.88  Such a contention, of 
course, assumes that such privileges actually do promote the 
institution of marriage and that society actually benefits from 
promoting marriage.89 
Likewise, the utilitarian argument supporting the spousal 
communications privilege contends that if such communications 
were not shielded from the reach of the court, intimacy in 
marriages everywhere would be “chilled.”90  However, two 
“[d]ebatable behavioral assumptions” underlie the utilitarian 
rationale.91  First, the theory assumes that federal evidentiary 
laws, and specifically the spousal communications privilege, are 
known and thus have influence over marital behavior.92  Second, 
the utilitarian theory assumes that destruction of the privilege 
would actually operate to discourage spouses from freely 
communicating.93 
2. Marital Privacy 
The marital privacy rationale, sometimes deemed the 
“humanistic” rationale,94 suggests that it is “fundamentally 
indecent” for the legal system to intrude upon the privacy of a 
marriage.95  This approach to spousal privileges differs from the 
utilitarian approach in that it focuses on the “value of protecting 
individual rights” rather than the overall benefits—and costs—to 
the public.96  Because marital privacy promotes personal 
autonomy and fosters intimacy between partners,97 American 
jurisprudence has traditionally given much weight to the 
 
88 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 359. 
89 See Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1578. 
90 See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 359; Developments in the Law, supra note 49, 
at 1577. 
91 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1578–79. 
92 Id. at 1578. 
93 Id. at 1579. 
94 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 360. 
95 Id.; see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges—A 
Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 48. 
96 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1583. 
97 Frost, supra note 38, at 24. 
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“[i]nsulat[ion]” of home and family life from outside influence.98  
Supporters of the privacy theory have pointed to decisions such 
as Griswold v. Connecticut,99 the Supreme Court case stating 
that there is a “private realm of family life” impenetrable by the 
government, as evidence that a constitutional protection for the 
marital relationship not only exists, but also must apply to 
communications made within the realm of that relationship.100  
Others have viewed the spousal privileges as protecting the 
privacy of the marital unit in that they shield it from “the 
dilemma of conflicting loyalties” inherent when a spouse is 
compelled by the government to testify against his or her 
defendant-spouse.101 
II. THE SPOUSAL CRIME EXCEPTION AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the role spousal privileges have historically played 
in the federal common law, even early courts recognized that, at 
times, the policy supporting such privileges may be outweighed 
by overwhelming interests in justice.  One example of such an 
overwhelming interest exists in the case of a crime committed by 
one spouse against the other.102  In such cases, the spousal 
privileges would, unless modified, typically function to bar a 
witness-spouse’s testimony.  Such a situation would result in, for 
example, a husband being effectively immune from prosecution 
for crimes committed against his wife in the home, where his 
wife would be the “only source of eyewitness testimony.”103  In 
response to this undesirable phenomenon, federal courts evolved 
to recognize a spousal crime exception to the privileges, such that  
 
 
98 Id. 
99 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
100 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1584 (quoting Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see also Black, supra note 95. 
101 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1584–85. 
102 The other example is the joint crime exception. In crimes where both spouses 
are participants, some federal courts have abrogated the adverse testimonial 
privilege and/or the marital communications privilege. See Frost, supra note 38, at 
39. Courts that have adopted the exception have stated that marriages wherein the 
spouses conspire to criminal activity are not “socially beneficial” and not worth 
preserving. Id.; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51–52 (1980); United 
States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 
299, 300–01 (7th Cir. 1983). As such, the need to ensure the administration of justice 
outweighs the public policy of promoting the marriage. 
103 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 361; see also Frost, supra note 38, at 41. 
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the spousal privileges typically will be inapplicable where a 
defendant is accused of committing an offense against his or her 
spouse.104 
In United States v. Allery, the Eighth Circuit became the 
first federal court to extend the scope of the spousal crime 
exception to also encompass crimes allegedly committed against 
the child or children of either spouse.  In Allery, the defendant 
appealed the district court’s decision to admit his wife’s adverse 
testimony regarding his actions on the evening he allegedly 
attempted to rape his twelve-year-old daughter.105  In 
contemplating the extension of the privilege, the Allery court 
noted that “a serious crime against a child is an offense against 
th[e] family harmony and to society as well”106 and, as such, the 
purposes of the adverse testimonial privilege would not be 
furthered by applying the privilege.107  The court went on to note 
that in child abuse cases, often the witness-spouse’s testimony is 
crucial to conviction, due to a lack of witnesses.108  Additionally, 
the Allery court noted that rules impeding “the discovery of 
truth” also impede “the doing of justice.”109  The court ultimately 
held that the spousal crime exception to the adverse testimonial 
privilege should be, and therefore was, extended in Eighth 
Circuit courts to apply where the defendant-spouse was charged 
with crimes against a child of either spouse.110 
Seventeen years later, in United States v. White, the Ninth 
Circuit had occasion to consider whether a defendant should be 
able to invoke the spousal communications privilege to bar a 
spouse’s testimony where the marital communication in question 
involved threats to kill the witness-spouse and her daughter.111  
 
104 The offenses committed in this context have been broadly interpreted to 
include “any personal wrong done to the other, whether physically, mentally or 
morally injurious.” United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). 
105 Id. at 1363. 
106 Id. at 1366. 
107 Id. at 1367. 
108 Id. at 1366. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1367. The Allery court also considered, in making its decision, the 
“strong state court authority” in favor of the premise that a crime against a child of 
either spouse is akin to a wrong committed against the other spouse. Id. at 1366. 
The court further noted that, at the time the court handed down its ruling, at least 
eleven states within the prior fifteen years alone had passed similar laws barring 
invocation of the spousal privilege where the defendant was accused of child abuse 
or neglect. Id. at 1367. 
111 United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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In White, the defendant was accused of voluntary manslaughter 
in connection with the death of his two-year-old stepdaughter, 
just a week after telling his wife that he would kill both her and 
her child if he were to be left to care for the child again.112  Using 
Allery as guidance, the court noted that protecting threats made 
against a spouse or a spouse’s children through application of the 
spousal communications privilege was inconsistent with the 
“long-standing public policy” interests of protecting marital 
integrity underlying the application of the privilege.113  By virtue 
of this decision, the Ninth Circuit effectively extended the scope 
of the spousal crime exception to the spousal communications 
privilege to encompass situations where the policy interests 
behind the privilege were not furthered by the application of the 
privilege.114 
Five years after the White decision, the Tenth Circuit in 
United States v. Bahe contemplated the application of the spousal 
communications privilege where the defendant-spouse was 
accused of sexually abusing an eleven-year-old female relative 
visiting the home.115  In that case, the court was faced with the 
issue of whether the privilege should function to bar the 
defendant’s wife from testifying about a specific sexual act the 
defendant often used to initiate sex with her.116  In its reasoning, 
the court noted that there was “no significant difference, as a 
policy matter” between a crime committed against a child of the 
married couple, as seen in Allery and White, and a child relative 
merely visiting the home.117  The court went on to note that in 
light of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and its charge to federal 
courts to modify spousal privileges according to “reason and 
experience,” it thought it appropriate to extend the logic of the 
spousal crime exception to all spousal testimony regarding abuse 
of a minor child within the household.118 
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Banks rejected the more 
expansive views taken by its sister circuits in considering the 
spousal crime exception.119  Rather, the Banks court opted to 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1138. 
114 Id. 
115 United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 See United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974–77 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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return to the balancing factors considered in Allery, zeroing in on 
an analysis of the purposes underlying the spousal privileges—
that is, promoting marital and family harmony—and the 
application of such privileges to offenses committed against the 
witness-spouse or the children of one or both of the spouses.120  
The Banks court noted that the rationale underlying the 
privileges would not be furthered by applying the spousal 
communications privilege to cases where the defendant was 
charged with crimes against the spouse or either the spouse’s 
child or “functional equivalent” and therefore limited its 
extension of the spousal crime exception to encompass such cases 
involving only children or “the functional equivalent” of 
children.121  The court declined, however, to extend this logic any 
further, holding that only “comparable familial ties” between 
actual and functional children rendered the extension of the 
spousal crime exception logical.122  In doing so, the court 
implicitly decided that the promotion of marital harmony would 
be furthered by, and indeed would justify, limiting the scope of 
the spousal crime exception to children and functional children of 
the spouses and that other minor children in the household 
would not merit the same level of legal protection against sexual 
abuse in the face of concerns over promoting marriage.123 
III. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413–415 AND CONGRESS’S 
VIEW 
The notion that sex crimes warrant separate evidentiary 
consideration is not a new one.124  In 1994, in response to growing 
public concern over sex offenders and the apparent inefficiencies 
of the criminal justice system in keeping post-release offenders 
from reoffending,125 Congress enacted new rules to be added to 
 
120 Id. at 976. 
121 Id. at 974. 
122 See id. at 975–76. 
123 See id. at 974–77; see also Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1792. 
124 See generally FED. R. EVID. 413–415; Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in 
Prosecutions for Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307, 313–15 (1993).  
125 R. Wade King, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By 
Answering the Public’s Call for Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did 
Congress Move Too Far Toward Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather 
than Guilt?, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2002). 
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the existing Federal Rules of Evidence.126  These new rules 
addressed a perceived gap in the evidentiary arena—namely, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)127 and its bar against evidence 
regarding the defendant’s prior acts to be introduced at trial.128  
A “traditional tenet[] of American evidentiary law,” this 
prohibition against admission of character evidence was widely 
accepted prior to the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 
414, and 415.129  Thus, the passage of these rules, which function 
to allow into evidence testimony regarding the defendant’s prior 
acts in certain sex crime prosecutions, represents a significant 
acknowledgement by Congress that sex crimes warrant specific 
consideration. 
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, Federal Rules of 
Evidence 404 and 405 governed the admissibility of character 
evidence in all types of federal prosecutions.130  Rule 404(a) states 
that character evidence is generally inadmissible as propensity 
evidence, except in limited circumstances.131  Rule 404(b) further 
states that while evidence of prior crimes or acts, like other 
character evidence, is not admissible to show propensity, it is 
admissible as to proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 
subject to particular requirements of pre-trial notice.132  Rule 405, 
for its part, states that evidence of “specific instances 
of . . . conduct” are admissible where a person’s character is an 
“essential element of a charge, claim, or defense” or during cross 
examination of a witness’s opinion or reputation testimony.133  
Thus, the ability to introduce evidence of prior specific acts or 
instances of conduct has long been severely limited in federal 
prosecutions. 
 
 
126 Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes Are Different: Why 
Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 
414 that Permit Propensity Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Other Sex Offenses, 
34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 113 (2004). 
127 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
128 King, supra note 125, at 1168. 
129 Id. 
130 See Michael S. Ellis, Comment, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of 
Evidence 413, 414, and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 964–65 (1998). 
131 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 405. 
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Functionally, Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405 codify 
traditions long established in American common law that aim to 
reduce prejudice.134  These traditions were born out of an attempt 
to prevent juries from drawing inferences about whether the 
defendant “acted in conformity with his character on the 
particular occasion when there would be little or no corroborating 
evidence.”135  Indeed, while evidence of prior acts may be 
exceedingly probative, such evidence also has a remarkable 
ability to confuse, surprise, and ultimately arouse prejudice 
within a jury.136  Therefore, limiting the admissibility of specific 
prior acts or conduct to situations where either the actor’s 
character is an essential element of a claim, or where the 
evidence is promulgated for certain enumerated purposes,137 
drastically limits the effect of this potentially prejudicial 
evidence.138  The disadvantage of such a limitation, of course, is 
the exclusion of evidence that may be of the utmost relevance 
and probative value.139 
Given these restrictions and their role as “one of the oldest 
fixtures in American Evidence law,”140 Federal Rules of Evidence 
413, 414, and 415 did not come without a fair amount of 
controversy.141  Proposed and supported by United States Senator 
Robert Dole and Representative Susan Molinari, these Rules 
essentially codify a ninth exception to Rule 404(b) by allowing 
evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct and sex 
offenses to be admitted at trial for the specific purpose of showing 
that defendant’s propensity to commit that type of crime.142  
Specifically, Rules 413, 414, and 415 apply in criminal 
 
134 Ellis, supra note 130, at 966. 
135 Id.; see also King, supra note 125, at 1170. 
136 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the 
American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment 
Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 290–292 (1994) [hereinafter 
Undertaking]; Ellis, supra note 130, at 967; King, supra note 125, at 1170–71. 
137 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
138 Ellis, supra note 130, at 967–68. 
139 See Beale, supra note 124, at 307–08. 
140 Undertaking, supra note 136, at 285. 
141 Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed 
Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 141 
(2001); see also 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. 
Schumer); 139 CONG. REC. S15138 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole); 
King, supra note 125, at 1178–81 (discussing Congress’s “[u]northodox” adoption of 
Rules 413 and 414). 
142 Lombardi, supra note 126, at 113–14. 
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prosecutions of sexual assault;143 criminal prosecutions of child 
sex abuse;144 and civil prosecutions alleging sexual assault or 
child molestation,145 respectively. 
In adopting these Rules, Congress looked to the uniqueness 
of sex crime cases as justification for “special standards and 
special treatment”—indeed, an altogether different evidentiary 
standard.146  Noting that both child-victim and adult-victim sex 
crime prosecutions have “distinctive characteristics” which make 
conviction inherently more difficult given traditional evidentiary 
maxims, Congress ultimately decided that both types of 
prosecutions needed a carve-out.147  In making this 
determination, Congress identified recurring issues in these 
prosecutions, such as credibility problems,148 unusual and specific 
dispositions of defendants toward sexual violence,149 the tendency 
of victims in both rape and child molestation cases to be too 
traumatized or intimidated to come forward,150 and the inherent 
he-said-she-said credibility wars.151  Indeed, notwithstanding the 
controversy surrounding the passage of these Rules,152 it is 
significant that Congress felt strongly enough about these unique 
attributes of sex crime prosecutions to pass new evidentiary rules 
specifically tailored to such prosecutions. 
 
 
143 FED. R. EVID. 413 (entitled “Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual-Assault 
Cases”). 
144 FED. R. EVID. 414 (entitled “Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation 
Cases”). 
145 FED. R. EVID. 415 (entitled “Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Involving 
Sexual Assault or Child Molestation”). 
146 See 139 CONG. REC. S15138 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
147 140 Cong. Rec. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See 140 CONG. REC. H5440 (daily ed. June, 29 1994). 
151 See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994); see also Beale, supra 
note 124, at 316–17 (discussing the “structural difficulty of proving sexual offenses” 
under the evidentiary rules in existence prior to the passage of Federal Rules of 
Evidence 413–15). 
152 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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IV. WHY THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ADOPT AN EXCEPTION TO 
THE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES WHERE A DEFENDANT IS ACCUSED OF A 
SEX CRIME 
Despite their well-established roots in federal evidentiary 
law, spousal privileges have undergone changes over the past few 
decades.  Recently, federal courts have taken varying 
perspectives on whether, and how far, to expand the application 
of the spousal crime exception to also apply to crimes against 
children.  In contemplating such an expansion, federal courts 
have looked to general policy interests and to rationales 
traditionally supporting the spousal privileges as guidance.  Part 
IV of this Note explains how “reason and experience”—the tools 
with which Federal Rule of Evidence 501 has armed the federal 
courts to shape and shift the boundaries of evidentiary 
privileges—have evolved to show that sex crime prosecutions, 
regardless of the victim’s age or relationship to the defendant, 
warrant their own exception to federal spousal privileges.  Part A 
explains why sex crimes are particularly heinous and uniquely 
reprehensible relative to other crimes of violence.  Part B 
discusses the ways in which sex crimes affect society at large, the 
problems inherent in prosecuting these crimes, and why the 
public has a particular interest in the successful and accurate 
resolution of such prosecutions.  Part C shows that the 
justifications underlying the continued use of spousal privileges 
in federal courts cannot support their application in sex crime 
prosecutions in light of competing policy concerns. 
A. The Inherently Heinous Nature of Sex Crimes and the 
Damage to the Victim 
As one scholar noted, “[f]ew types of crime command the 
same public attention and evoke the same level of outrage as 
sexual offenses.”153  Indeed, sexual assaults tend to be more 
psychologically damaging to their victims than other crimes.154  
In America, the general public has come to view rape as “the 
 
153 Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of 
New York State’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 284, 284 (2008). 
154 Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST.: 
REV. RES. 43, 49 (1998). 
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most heinous crime,” deserving of severe punishment.155  Sexual 
offenses by their very nature are “personally invasive” in a 
manner fundamentally different from other violent crimes, in 
that they undermine their victims’ reproductive strategies and 
choices.156  Whether the victim is a child or an adult, the 
tremendous and arguably unparalleled psychological effects of 
sex crimes are compelling in their severe and enduring nature.157 
Rape has been described as “one of the most brutal, invasive 
and degrading” crimes, resulting in “intense trauma” and 
“profound and lasting injury” to its victims.158  In addition to the 
physical injuries inherent in the assault itself,159 the emotional 
effects are often severe and lifelong.160  Post-rape psychological 
and emotional problems include suicidal ideation, sleep 
disturbances, phobic responses, eating disorders, helplessness, 
dependency, and decreased libido.161  Studies have indicated that 
rape victims are thirteen times more likely to develop major 
alcohol dependency and abuse problems, and twenty-six times 
more likely to develop major drug problems, than are other non-
sexual assault victims.162  Rape-induced trauma, sometimes 
known as rape-induced post-traumatic stress disorder, also 
affects one-third of all rape victims.163  Symptoms of rape-induced 
trauma, a chronic psychological condition, include diminished 
self-worth, fearfulness, anxiety, sleeplessness, extreme fear,  
 
 
155 See Corey Rayburn, Better Dead than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric 
Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1138 (2004); Lieb et al., 
supra note 154, at 45–46. 
156 Lieb et al., supra note 154, at 48. 
157 See infra Part IV.A; see also Beale, supra note 124, at 317 (stating that “[t]he 
injury resulting from sex offenses is more serious than that associated with most 
other offenses”); Undertaking, supra note 136, at 298. 
158 Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On the Basis of Sex”: Recognizing 
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, STAN. L. & POL’Y REV., Spring 1994, at 21, 30. 
159 Physical injuries can include, among other things, injury from the rape itself, 
injury from any physical assault accompanying the rape, and sexually transmitted 
diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Id. 
160 See Kathryn M. Carney, Note, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 315, 344 (2001); Lombardi, supra note 126, at 118. 
161 Weisburd & Levin, supra note 158, at 30–31; see also Martha R. Holmes & 
Janet S. St. Lawrence, Treatment of Rape-Induced Trauma: Proposed Behavioral 
Conceptualization and Review of the Literature, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 417, 419 
(1983). 
162 Carney, supra note 160, at 345. 
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intrusive thoughts, nightmares, and depression.164  Sexual 
dysfunctions and impaired relationships are also common 
aftereffects of sexual assault.165 
Child victims of sex offenses face physical and psychological 
consequences all their own.  For this vulnerable population, the 
trauma caused by the molestation or assault often leads to 
feelings of isolation, fear, helplessness and guilt.166  Indeed, 
children who are victims of sexual abuse are more likely to 
develop post-traumatic stress disorder than are those who are 
victim to physical abuse only.167  Moreover, child victims are 
more likely to engage in abnormal or unusual sexual behaviors168 
and may display violent tendencies and sexual aggression.169  In 
one study, up to ninety percent of sex offenders reported that 
they themselves were once victims of childhood sexual abuse.170 
B. The Social Costs: Damage to Society, Problems in 
Prosecution, and the Importance of Successful and Accurate 
Prosecutions 
1. The Effects on Society 
Sexual assault and abuse do not just affect the life of the 
victim; society also feels their effects.  Aside from physical 
injuries, sexual assault and rape bring risks of unwanted 
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.171  Victims often 
suffer severe sexual dysfunctions with current and future 
intimate partners,172 which may significantly impact the victim’s 
own relationship or marriage.  All areas of the victim’s social 
 
164 Id.; see also Holmes & St. Lawrence, supra note 161, at 418. 
165 Holmes & St. Lawrence, supra note 161, at 418; see also infra Part IV.B.1. 
166 Nathan K. Bays, Comment, A Rush to Punishment: The Louisiana Supreme 
Court Upholds the Death Penalty for Child Rape in State v. Kennedy, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 339, 342 (2007). 
167 Lieb et al., supra note 154. 
168 Id. 
169 Bays, supra note 166. 
170 Id. at 341–42. 
171 Carney, supra note 160. One study showed that approximately 4.7% of adult 
women who experienced at least one rape in their lifetimes became pregnant as a 
result of rape. Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A 
Discussion and Analysis of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who 
Become Mothers Through Rape, 98 Geo. L.J. 827, 828 (2010). Another study found 
that approximately fifty percent of women who became pregnant through rape 
underwent abortions. Id. at 829. 
172 Holmes & St. Lawrence, supra note 161, at 418–20. 
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functioning, including his or her work, personal interactions, and 
marital and familial relationships, are affected after a sexual 
assault.173  Furthermore, studies have shown a strong correlation 
between child victims of sexual offenses and the tendency for 
such victims to show sexual aggression, sometimes resulting in 
the victim perpetrating sexual offenses against other children 
and adults.174 
2. The Unique Positioning of the Victim and the Tendency To 
Underreport 
The nature of sexual assault typically dictates that it takes 
place secretly and privately, only involving the victim and the 
perpetrator and leaving no neutral witnesses.175  Sexual assault 
often puts the victim in the unique position of being the only one 
who can report the crime.  This unique position, however, creates 
a new issue in turn:  Sexual assault and rape trials become 
“unresolvable swearing matches.”176  A “credibility contest 
between [the] two parties,”177 the victim must convince 
everyone—law enforcement, the prosecution, and ultimately the 
jury—that he or she is telling the truth.  These credibility issues 
are exacerbated in sex crime prosecutions involving child-victims, 
where the child may be very young or have difficulty 
communicating his or her version of the events.178  Furthermore, 
studies have shown that jurors tend to focus on irrelevant 
factors, such as the victim’s clothing, lifestyle, and demeanor, in 
determining whether the victim was actually sexually 
assaulted.179  Studies of jury behavior have shown that jurors 
tend to view victims as having brought the sexual assaults on 
themselves by consuming alcohol or by wearing seductive 
clothing.180 
 
173 Id. 
174 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
175 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense 
Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 20 (1994); Lombardi, supra note 
126, at 117. 
176 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994). 
177 Lombardi, supra note 126, at 117. 
178 Beale, supra note 124, at 317 & n.35. 
179 See Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1585, 1588 (2007); Carney, supra note 160, at 346. 
180 Weisburd & Levin, supra note 158, at 31. 
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In addition to the anticipated problems in prevailing over the 
perpetrator at trial, centuries of biased requirements in sexual 
assault prosecutions have led victims to shy away from reporting 
for fear of being victimized a second time at the hands of a biased 
law enforcement and legal system.181  Even though many, if not 
all, of these biased requirements have been modified or abolished 
in modern law, the vestiges of society’s message toward victims 
still serve to shape a victim’s perception of how a reported sex 
crime will be treated by law enforcement.182  Indeed, “[d]espite 
decades of legal reform of the formal law of rape, there has not 
been a substantial change in the proportion of victims who are 
willing to report having been raped to the police.”183  According to 
a 1995 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, rape is the 
violent crime that is least likely to be reported to the police.184 
A third but significant problem in reporting is the delay with 
which victims decide to report, if they decide to report at all.185  
Because friends and acquaintances commit fifty-three percent of 
all rapes and sexual assaults,186 there is often a considerable 
amount of emotional turmoil which goes into a victim’s decision 
of whether or not to report.  Aside from the shame experienced by 
the victim from the assault itself, there is an added layer of guilt 
and grief over whether to disrupt his or her social or familial 
network.187  Additionally, self-blame, fear of police refusal or 
inability to help, and fear of retaliation from the perpetrator188 
may cause victims to be reluctant or afraid to report right 
away.189  Unfortunately, this delay in reporting often translates  
 
 
181 See Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: 
Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 927–35 
(2001) (explaining the ways in which law enforcement and state and local 
prosecutors tend to use a “selection process” in determining whether rape allegations 
are valid, whether to investigate the crime, and whether to apprehend the suspect, 
depending on factors such as the victim’s own perceived culpability and whether the 
case seems winnable); Carney, supra note 160, at 346. 
182 See Anderson, supra note 181, at 927. 
183 Id. at 937. 
184 Ronet Bachman, Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?: A Response to 
Pollard (1995), 22 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 81, 94 (1995); see also Orenstein, supra 
note 179, at 1591 (stating that “rape is wildly underreported”). 
185 See Lombardi, supra note 126, at 117. 
186 Anderson, supra note 181, at 921. 
187 See id. at 922 nn.78–80. 
188 Carney, supra note 160, at 344–45. 
189 Karp, supra note 175, at 20–21. 
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into a severe lack of current physical evidence once the assault 
has been reported,190 leaving the victim with his or her credibility 
alone to convince a jury that the event occurred at all. 
3. Recidivism Rates Among Sexual Perpetrators and Why 
Successful Prosecutions Are So Important 
Studies have shown that sex offenders tend to be highly 
recidivistic.191  Moral inhibitions, along with the threat of 
criminal prosecution and incarceration, operate to deter most 
members of society from committing sex crimes, even if they do 
possess the inclination.192  However, offenders with a history of 
committing unwanted sexual acts upon others have 
demonstrated that these usual deterrents are not enough to keep 
them from resisting their impulses.193  The practical and legal 
risks involved in committing crimes do not deter these 
offenders,194 and the result is that sex offenders are four times 
more likely than any other released prisoner to commit another 
sex crime.195  Rapists are 10.5% more likely than other released 
prisoners to be arrested for a subsequent rape.196 
Studies have also indicated that sex offenders escape 
detection twice as often as they are apprehended for their 
crimes.197  Indeed, in one study involving convicted rapists (with 
an average of three convictions on record) and child molesters 
(with an average of two convictions on record), each offender 
reported having committed an average of five similar offenses for 
which they were never apprehended.198  A significant number of 
rapists and child molesters are chronic perpetrators and have 
avoided apprehension for dozens and even, in some cases, 
 
190 Lombardi, supra note 126, at 117. Professor Imwinkelried has argued that 
the nature of sexual assault and child molestation often makes it more likely that 
the perpetrators will leave behind evidence such as DNA, blood, semen, or saliva 
which may be used at trial. Undertaking, supra note 136, at 299–300. Unfortunately, 
he neglects to take into account that the use of such evidence is contingent upon 
prompt reporting by and medical attention to the victim. 
191 Wells & Motley, supra note 141, at 143. 
192 Karp, supra note 175. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Lombardi, supra note 126, at 118–19. 
196 Carney, supra note 160, at 348. 
197 A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child 
Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 456 (1982). 
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hundreds of sex crimes.199  Presumably, given the issues with 
underreporting and delayed reporting, the lack of viable evidence 
in the prosecution of sex crimes, and the tendency of law 
enforcement officials and state actors to drop claims of sex 
offenses,200 it is relatively easy for sex offenders to stay under the 
radar for a significant amount of time before they are finally 
convicted for a single offense.  In light of these challenges and the 
gravity of injury caused by sex offenses, society has a 
“correspondingly greater need to prosecute offenders 
successfully.”201 
C. The Justifications and Why They Fail To Support the 
Application of Spousal Privileges in Sex Crime Prosecutions 
Justice Frankfurter once stated that evidentiary privileges 
are tolerable “only to the very limited extent that permitting a 
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good 
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all 
rational means for ascertaining truth.”202  Although the 
utilitarian and marital privacy theories of justification have 
traditionally been promulgated in support of the spousal 
privileges, the “public good” in promoting marriage and 
protecting marital communications cannot possibly “transcend” 
society’s interest in securing successful and correct outcomes in 
sex crime prosecutions. 
1. The Utilitarian Analysis 
a. The Utilitarian Analysis and the Adverse Testimonial Privilege 
The utilitarian approach to preserving the adverse 
testimonial privilege does not ultimately support application of 
the privileges in prosecutions for sex crimes.  The utilitarian 
arguments in favor of the adverse testimonial privilege contend 
that the societal goals of promoting marriage and preventing a 
loyal spouse’s perjury outweigh the need for reliable and 
probative evidence.203  However, in order to evaluate whether this 
 
199 Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by 
Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 286 (1991). 
200 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
201 Beale, supra note 124, at 317. 
202 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
203 See supra Part I.C. 
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contention is true with respect to the application of the adverse 
testimonial privilege in sex crime prosecutions, two tiers of 
analysis are necessary.204  First, one must examine whether the 
privilege actually tends to promote the institution of marriage.205  
Second, one must evaluate whether there is merit to the 
contention that society benefits from promoting the institution of 
marriage.206 
Many scholars and commentators have challenged the claim 
that the adverse testimonial privilege actually prevents marital 
discord and promotes marriage.207  Professor Wigmore has 
argued that, in light of the many factors which influence the 
marital relationship, the danger of discord arising as a result of 
one spouse testifying against the other is only a casual and minor 
one.208  Given the small percentage of marriages that even 
encounter a situation where one spouse may testify against the 
other, it would seem a stretch at best to say that the existence of 
the adverse testimonial privilege has a marked effect on the 
institution of marriage.  As one scholar noted, “[t]he degree to 
which privileges promote family harmony and confidentiality is 
speculative, while the damage of lost evidence, though difficult to 
assess precisely, is certain.”209 
The argument that society as a whole benefits from 
promoting legal—and, by extension, often solely heterosexual—
marriage may be similarly misguided.210  The institution of 
“heterosexual, monogamous marriage” has been traditionally 
viewed as the “preeminent intimate relationship in Western 
society.”211  However, as individuals “perceive themselves with 
more control than before” over decisions regarding sexuality, 
procreation, marriage, and divorce,212 the modern relationship 
has evolved into a different institution than that which the 
spousal privileges originally were designed to support.  As one 
scholar noted, if spousal privileges are designed to protect family 
intimacy, their “exclusive focus on legal marriage is 
 
204 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1578. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2332. 
209 Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1581. 
210 Id. at 1582. 
211 Id. at 1581. 
212 Regan, supra note 67, at 2074. 
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inappropriate.”213  Because other intimate relationships, such as 
parents and children, cohabiting partners, and homosexual 
couples, are not afforded the luxury of spousal privileges,214 it 
seems a dubious contention that it benefits society at large to 
continue protecting certain intimate relationships and not others.  
As notions of family and intimacy evolve, blind deference to the 
traditional institution of marriage wholly ignores other accepted 
and ordinary forms of loving commitment.  Indeed, as one scholar 
commented, “[m]any other relationships are also intimate and 
loving, and many traditional marriages are marked by violence 
and domination.”215  If the goal of the adverse testimonial 
privilege is to foster marital harmony for the benefit of family 
and children, its limitation to one form of intimate relationship in 
this day and age is inconsistent with that stated goal.  Should 
public perception of the legal system be a concern at all, the 
explicit protection of only legal, heterosexual marriage arguably 
could further public distrust, in that non-traditional families 
denied the privilege’s protection may be subject to very different 
legal outcomes than might other, more traditional families.  
While the sacred nature of the marital union has long been 
revered, pure deference to the institution seems a shaky 
foundation for the continued application of the adverse 
testimonial privilege, at least where it operates to exclude 
reliable, probative, and often crucial evidence of sexual offenses. 
b. The Utilitarian Analysis and the Spousal Communications 
Privilege 
The utilitarian analysis similarly fails in supporting the 
application of the spousal communications privilege in sex crime 
prosecutions.  Because the spousal communications privilege 
specifically concerns communications made in confidentiality 
between the defendant-spouse and the witness-spouse, it is 
subject to Professor Wigmore’s four-factor analysis.  While the 
privilege arguably satisfies the first factor, it may not satisfy the 
second and third, and certainly must fail the last. 
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To satisfy the four-prong test, Professor Wigmore first 
requires that the communication be based on a confidence that 
the communications in question will not be disclosed to others.216  
This prong is contingent on the circumstances of the disclosure 
itself and is reflected in the general rules, in that the 
communication must be made without the presence of a third 
party and without the understanding that the communication 
will or could be disclosed to a third party.217  Because it is likely 
that a sex offender who makes incriminating remarks to his or 
spouse expects that disclosure to remain confidential, this Note 
will assume that this first factor is satisfied. 
The second requirement of Wigmore’s balancing test 
mandates that the confidentiality of communications between the 
parties is “essential” to the maintenance of the relationship.218  
The argument that the protection of confidentiality between the 
parties is essential to the marital relationship necessarily implies 
that the general public is even aware that legal privileges protect 
their communications.219  On the contrary, it is widely believed 
that, aside from lawyers, “virtually no one is aware of the 
existence of the marital privileges.”220  Spousal intimacy is “so 
great” and the need for communication is typically “so 
compelling” that it is difficult to imagine that the absence of a 
spousal privilege would serve to chill marital communications.221  
In contrast, the legal protection of confidentiality as to 
disclosures made in the context of a professionally privileged 
relationship—that is, communications made between a penitent 
and a clergyperson, a patient and a psychotherapist, or a client 
and an attorney—is absolutely essential in order for these 
disclosures to even occur.222  Whereas it is quite believable that a 
client may hesitate or completely refuse to disclose sensitive 
information to his or her attorney without the utmost legal 
protections against that disclosure being used against him at 
trial, it is much less believable that a spouse would contemplate 
 
216 See supra Part I.C.1. 
217 See supra Part I.B. 
218 See supra Part I.C.1. 
219 Frost, supra note 38, at 16. 
220 Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1809; see also Rules of Evidence for United States 
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 245–46 (1972) (stating that parties “in all 
likelihood are unaware” of the existence of the spousal communications privilege). 
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evidentiary privileges—or lack thereof—in choosing to disclose 
sensitive information to his or her spouse.223  Indeed, Professor 
McCormick, the author of a noted treatise on evidence, has stated 
that “while the danger of injustice from suppression of relevant 
proof is clear and certain, the probable benefits of the rule of 
privilege in encouraging marital confidences and wedded 
harmony are marginal.”224 
Thirdly, Professor Wigmore requires that the relationship 
protected is one which must be “sedulously fostered.”225  
However, it is unclear whether it is appropriate for society to 
place such importance on the legal marital relationship in light of 
the changing nature of intimate relationships.226  Furthermore, 
while at least part of the motivation behind promoting candor 
between spouses relates to promoting healthy environments for 
raising children, marriage is no longer the only context in which 
children are typically raised.227  As traditional notions of family 
change,228 so do parental circumstances, and such circumstances 
may or may not involve legal marriage.  It is at least debatable 
whether the traditional idea of marriage is something the legal 
system is charged with “sedulously fostering.” 
However tenuous the satisfaction of Professor Wigmore’s 
first three utilitarian factors by the spousal communications 
privilege, the utilitarian justification must ultimately fail upon 
consideration of the fourth balancing factor.  Professor Wigmore 
suggested that a court should only recognize a privilege when the 
injury caused to the relationship in question by the disclosure of 
the communications is greater than the benefit gained by the 
admission of such evidence at trial.229  This fourth factor of 
analysis gets to the heart of the cost-benefit calculation, and 
within this analysis the overwhelming interests in the correct 
resolution of litigation230 in sex crime prosecutions are at their 
most salient.  Sexual offenses are widely considered to be one of 
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the most heinous categories of crime committed against a person, 
and result in profound harm to the victims.231  Their effects are 
felt throughout society and may even increase the number of 
future sexual predators.232  Sex crimes are woefully 
underreported, and such reports, if made at all, may be so 
delayed out of fear, shame, or trauma that crucial evidence is 
often already lost by the time the victim comes forward.233  Given 
such difficulties in prosecution, it is relatively easy for sex 
offenders and abusers to escape detection, with perpetrators 
often offending against multiple victims by the time 
apprehension does occur.234  Such policy interests are 
overwhelming and certainly outweigh society’s interests in 
providing debatable protection to marital intimacy. 
2. The Marital Privacy Justification 
The marital privacy justification, similar to the utilitarian 
arguments, ultimately fails to support application of the spousal 
privileges in federal sex crime prosecutions.  Despite some 
commentators’ claims that there is a constitutional realm of 
privacy, emanating from the Griswold v. Connecticut235 decision 
and extending to the marital relationship, courts have repeatedly 
stated that family privileges are not constitutionally rooted.236  If 
the spousal communications privilege were rooted in familial 
privacy, it would presumably apply throughout each family 
relationship, including sibling-sibling, parent-child, and parent-
parent.237  The familial or marital privacy rationale similarly 
cannot support the adverse testimonial privilege, as the privilege 
would be both under-inclusive, in that it applies to adverse, and 
not neutral, testimony, and over-inclusive, in that it applies to 
non-confidential testimony as well as confidential testimony, in 
 
231 See supra Part IV.A. 
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233 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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its fulfillment of such an aim.238  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Trammel noticeably did not take marital privacy into 
account when it allowed the adverse testimonial privilege to be 
waived by the witness-spouse over the objections of the 
defendant-spouse.239  Had the Court intended marital privacy to 
be a consideration, surely it would have considered the detriment 
caused to such privacy by allowing one spouse to reveal 
potentially incriminating facts he or she learned by virtue of the 
intimate marital relationship. 
Whatever the normative value of privacy may be, it still 
must be weighed against other, competing societal interests.240  
Protecting marital privacy in the realm of evidentiary law 
necessarily means lost information.  As one commentator noted, 
“[t]he more private the information, the less likely it can be 
obtained from a source outside the spouse, and therefore the 
greater the harm to the legal process if it is protected by a 
privilege.”241  Once again, the balancing aspect of Professor 
Wigmore’s utilitarian analysis becomes important, as the 
competing interests in marital privacy must weigh against 
society’s interest in obtaining information crucial to a criminal 
prosecution, which may not be found anywhere else. 
Significantly, feminist critics have attacked the marital 
privacy rationale for an entirely different but equally relevant 
reason.242  These critics have argued that the traditional notion of 
familial privacy frequently was used to justify isolation of the 
family from state interference and was instrumental in 
“perpetuating traditional gender hierarchies and power 
imbalances.”243  These notions long insulated women from the 
legal system, sending a powerful message that women “[were] 
not important enough to merit legal regulation.”244  Similar to the 
historical tendency for law enforcement to re-victimize victims of 
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sexual assault, and the lasting effect that re-victimization has 
had on underreporting, there is a danger that allowing “marital 
privacy” concerns to prevail over sexual assault victims’ safety 
could perpetuate women’s mistrust of the legal system. 
CONCLUSION 
While the spousal privileges have enjoyed a long and deeply 
rooted place in American jurisprudence, it cannot be denied that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 has bestowed upon the federal 
courts the ability to use their “reason and experience” to shape 
evidentiary privileges.  This ability reflects an acknowledgement 
that as cultural and societal norms change, public policy 
interests may shift, ultimately rendering some privileges 
inapplicable or inappropriate in various situations.  Sex crimes 
inflict some of the worst and most traumatic effects upon their 
victims among all violent crimes and indeed bear with them a 
unique repugnance and reprehensibility.  Such crimes pose grave 
risks to society and, as such, it is extremely important that sex 
crime prosecutions are resolved successfully and accurately.  
However, for a variety of reasons, these prosecutions bring 
significant hurdles for prosecutors to overcome.  In light of 
Congress’s explicit recognition of these facts through its passage 
of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, it is important 
that the legal community take a serious and focused look at 
spousal privileges in order to determine whether these ancient 
impediments to the truth-seeking function of the courts are 
warranted any longer in sex crime prosecutions.  As federal 
courts struggle with whether and how to broaden the scope of the 
spousal crime exception, this Note urges those courts to turn 
their focus away from factors such as the victim’s age and the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim and instead 
look to the crime alleged.  In the face of the strong public policy 
interests in favor of successfully resolving sex crime prosecutions, 
the traditionally-cited justifications underlying the spousal 
privileges cannot support their continued application, and 
therefore a ripe opportunity exists to carve a new exception to the 
spousal privileges in federal sex crime prosecutions. 
 
